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Moral judgment involves a delicate interplay of ideals and facts. A 
reflective moral appraisal of an activity must be based not only on • 
clear-eyed commitment to ideals, but also on patient analysis of t he 
factual dimensions of the activity at hand. If this is so, moral Judg- . 
ment must be both as fixed as our commitment to traditional moral 
principles and as mobile as our evolving human experience. Moral 
appraisal of medical technology is a case in point: commitment to 
respect all human life must be constantly integrated with knowledge 
of the facts of expanding medical power. 
Those who are morally opposed to abortion, even so-called thera-
peutic abortion, have had good reasons to be wary of prenatal 
diagnosis. I The foremost of these reasons, of course, is the cl~se 
factual association of techniques like amniocentesis with select1ve 
abortion. In the face of these facts, commitment to respect all human 
life has appeared to be incompatible with the search for defects in the 
fetus. Recently, however, there have been medical developments 
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whi.ch hold out the possibility of factually separating prenatal diag-
nosis from selective abortion. 2 
If prenatal diagnosis can now occur in an environm~nt free from 
association with abortion and if it can bring important benefits of its 
o~n, t~en it . is. time for a reappraisal of the moral status of prenatal 
d1agn.os1s. Th1s 1s what I propose here. First, the arguments against the 
prac~lCe of prenatal diagnosis will be reviewed. Secondly, these new 
me~1cal ~evelopments, as well as other reasons favoring prenatal diag-
nosis, w1ll be presented. Finally, a concluding reappraisal will be 
offered. 
I. Reasons to Oppose Prenatal Diagnosis 
. ~s already stated, the major moral concern about prenatal diagnosis 
lS 1ts close empirical association with selective abortion of fetuses 
found to have some defect. The connection between the two was 
perceived to be so close, in fact , that in many centers where amnio-
centesis was performed in its early years (over a decade ago) commit-
men~ ~o abortion of a defective fetus was made a prerequisite for 
obtammg the procedure. Apparently this was or still is the case in 
~me centers into the 1980s. 3 The justification offered for establish-
mg this prerequisite is the existence of some risk to the (normal) fetus 
and the desire to restrict access to a limited resource. 
Even when no such explicit prerequisite prevails, the linkage 
between prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion has been close. 
· ~tho.ugh. the results of the vast majorit~ of thes.e procedures are 
ga~lVe, 1.e., they reveal no fetal defect,4 m the mmds of many is a 
:admess to abort should a defect be identified. In a recent Canadian 
ce udy,. for example, of 74 ~orne~ who were about to undergo amnio-
. ntes1s, 84% reported an mtentwn to abort if a genetic defect was 
d~nosed; 4 7% even reported that reaching a decision on abortion in 
th1s situation was not difficult. 5 
Undoubtedly, among the reasons why so many of these women 
~ou?~ this choice ~n easy one ~s the pr~sumption that of all abortion 
ec1s1ons, the cho1ce of selective abortwn based on genetic defect is 
the ~ost justifiable .. This presumption has some appeal when one 
COnce.lVes of the range of frivolous considerations which may produce 
abortwns in a situation of widely available abortion " on demand ." By 
c?ntrast, one can readily understand and appreciate the tragic dimen-
;lons of a bad prenatal diagnosis. Diagnosis of serious defect in the 
etus causes the woman to be concerned about the effects on her 
personal life , the life of her family, the affected child, society as a 
~hole, and on family finances. s Admitting this there remains a sense ~ Which this sort of abortion choice is more' morally objectionable 
.han others. Presumably, the dominant reason for abortion decisions 
lrl general is the desire not to have a child -any child . In this case, 
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however, the desire is not to have this child , or this kind of cl id. 
Implied in this choice, then, is a denial of the fundamental equalit of 
all persons and the establishment, instead, of kinds of human pers ns, 
some of whom are acceptable, some of whom are not. 7 Prenatal c lg· 
nosis thus appears as an attempt to identify, so as to destroy , he 
wrong kind of human person. 
Another concern about prenatal diagnosis is that its availability .nd 
its ·association with selective abortion may be encouraging s- me 
women to delay childbearing choices until decades of their ves 
known to be associated with higher incidences of ge1 'tic 
anomalies.s Of course, there are other, more benign reasons rhy • 
women are delaying pregnancies - educational goals, career as ira· 
tions, the struggle to attain their rightful (but long denied) pla1 · in 
society generally. 9 Still, one cannot help but suspect that the ~ ail-
ability of prenatal diagnosis, coupled with selective abortio J . is 
making the higher risks of advanced age pregnancies more accep< lble 
to some. 
Of concern as well is the use of prenatal diagnosis, not for ide • tifi· 
cation of fetal defect, but for identification of an undesirable get j er. 
Followed by selective abortion, prenatal diagnosis can be a vehicl for 
sex selection. Though the use of prenatal diagnosis for this pun ose 
was strongly opposed in guidelines offered by the Genetics ResE uch 
Group of the Hastings Center, ,_o the co-director of the group, Jo r n C. 
Fletcher, subsequently changed his view . His revised opinion tun s on 
the claim that to accept the logic of Roe v. Wade (he does) is to a r ept 
abortion for any reason, even the most trivial. He argues that " . . . it IS 
inconsistent to support an abortion law that protects the absd ute 
right of women to decide and., at the same time, to block access to 
information about the fetus because one thinks that an abortion maY 
be foolishly sought on the basis of the information." u At least one . 
commentator has found some irony in Fletcher's consistency. Citing 
studies that show that non-Hispanic American wives prefer so ns to 
daughters generally, and overwhelmingly prefer that sons be first-born, 
sociologist Gertrud Lenzer thinks it unlikely that the high court 
meant, " ... to guarantee women the right of self-determination for 
the purpose of discriminating against their own kind by either d oing . 
away with the fetuses of their own sex or by choosing male children as 
their first-borns .... "12 Irony aside, sex selection by way of prenatal ' 
diagnosis and abortion is clearly repugnant to the ideal of respect for 
the dignity of all human lives. 
Finally, there are moral issues raised by prenatal diagnosis even 
without reference to abortion. Though sonography carries no known ! 
risk, amniocentesis, amniography, and fetoscopy all carry small but 
real risks of fetal injury_l3 The imposition of a risk on a human being I 
always requires moral justification. Furthermore, since the fetus 15 
obviously incapable of giving or withholding informed consent for the 
procedure, proxy consent from the mother must suffice. This fact 
raises the possibility of cases of conflict of interest between mother 
and fetus, and the resultant question of the validity of the former's 
informed consent. 14 · 
II. Reasons for Favoring Prenatal Diagnosis Now 
The major reason why someone committed to respect for all 
human life must now reappraise opposit_ion to prenatal diagnosis is the 
fact that some, and a growing number, of fetal defects can now be 
treated in utero. In a 1981 article, Drs. Michael Harrison, Mitchell 
Golbus, and Roy Filly listed the following conditions amenable to 
~reatment in utero: deficient pulmonary surfactant (pulmonary 
Immaturity), anemia-erythroblastos and hydrops, hypothyroidism and 
goiter, methylmalonic acidemia (B12-dependent), multiple car-
?oxylase deficiency (biotin-dependent), nutritional deficiency and 
Intrauterine growth retardation, bilateral hydronephrosis (urethral 
obstruction), diaphragmatic hernia, and obstructive hydrocephalus. The 
doctors assert that " [ t] he rationale for early correction is unique to 
each anomaly, but the principle remains the same: continued gestation 
would have a progressive ill effect on the fetus. " 15 In utero interven-
ti_o? to correct these anomalies, on the other hand, offers the possi-
bthty of lessening their negative impact on the developing fetus and of 
~nhancing his or her chances of living a normal and satisfying human 
hfe. Two of the more dramatic cases can represent the possibilities 
here. 
Prenatal diagnosis of a 41-year-old woman revealed the presence of 
twins, one of whom had a markedly distended bladder. 16 After sev-
eral unsuccessful attempts to treat this swelling (and the urinary 
obstruction causing it) in less invasive ways, a tiny catheter inside a 
needle was passed through the mother's abdomen and placed in the 
fetus, one end in its bladder, the other in the amniotic sac. The 
bladder immediately emptied. At birth there were other anomalies 
Which required surgery. But" [t]he postoperative course was unremark-
able with the neonate demonstrating normal pulmonary and renal 
~nction." 17 The in utero catheterization probably saved the child 's 
life, since infants born with high-grade obstructions such as these 
often die. "[C] ontinued obstruction will result in a kidney, the devel-
opment of which is so impaired as to prevent survival, while relief of 
the obstruction may allow sufficient development as to support post-
natal life and allow ' catch-up' development during early childhood." 1s 
In a second remarkable case, prenatal sonography of a 26-year-old 
'ivoman revealed a fetus suffering from hydrocephalus.19 The great 
danger of this buildup of fluid pressure on the brain is severe brain 
damage. Even when this fluid pressure is relieved by a shunting proce-
dure at birth, much irreparable damage can already have occurred. 
Furthermore, the increased size of the fetus 's head usually causes gross 
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disfigurement and distortion of facial features, as well as greater diff -
culty for fetus and mother if a vaginal delivery is attempted. Face 1 
with these prospects, an in utero shunt was specially designed ar l 
placed, by needle through the mother's abdomen, into the h ead of tl e 
24-week-old fetus. The shunt operated as planned, relieving the flu j , 
pressure on the fetus's brain, until the 32nd week . At t hat time tl e 
shunt became obstructed and a Caesarean delivery was performed. " . . t ' 
delivery the infant was vigorous and active. " There was no questi1 n 
that the shunt had prevented the usual facial disfigurement ; the chil< 's 
face and skull appeared normal. Though only time and developm( 1t 
will confirm normal brain function, the child's brain is . .. cleaJ ly 
more normal than it would have been if no treatment had been given ." 2
1 
These dramatic cases, and the several others being reported with m re 
and more frequency, demonstrate that we are on the verge of havi ( a 
powerful new medical technology which will allow in utero treatm nt 
of a growing list of fetal defects. Obviously, such treatment is im~ J S· 
sible without prenatal diagnosis. Hence the first reason for favm ng 
prenatal diagnosis is the new treatment potential it opens and he 
obvious reduction in human .deaths and sufferings such treatment ·an 
mean. Clearly there are ethical problems of proportionate risk nd 
informed consent raised by these in utero procedures (consider ,he 
implications of the presence of the normal twin in the first case, for 
example). Nevertheless, " .. . one clearly positive aspect is that >re-
na tal diagnosis of a fetal malformation may now lead to treatn ent 
rather than abortion ." 22 
The character of future advances in in utero treatment rna:-, be 
surmised by reference to recent research on primates. 2 3 One of the 
most common major congenital malformations, neural tube d( feet 
(especially spina bifida), is being attacked with research on the feL.1ses 
of rhesus monkeys. In the U.S ., approximately two of every tholl';and 
births are afflicted with a serious neural tube defect (in the U.K. , it is 
six to eight per thousand), and this anomaly is often associated with • 
hydrocephalus, mental retardation, disfigurement and paralysis of 
limbs, urinary and bowel incontinence, early demise, and, of course, 
the acute human sufferings consequent to these conditions. 24 Those 
researching with these primates have developed a bone paste which, 
when inserted into the affected monkey fetus, can facilitate the 
closing of fissures of the neural tube. Such work also has revealed 
some surprising advantages to fetal surgery . As one might expect, 
earlier treatment has the advantage of limiting the range of other 
problems which are caused by the neural tube defect itself. But one 
might not have expected that: 1) the risk of immune rejection of bone , 
transplant is lowered dramatically because of the undeveloped charac· 
ter of the fetal immune surveillance system, 2) there is far more rapid I 
healing in the fetus than in the neonate, 3) infections are combatted 
by transplacental passage of maternal immune factors , 4) the wornb 
environment makes the ost-o er . . . general, and 5) medicin! admfn . :tiv~ P;.nod techmcally simplified in 
effective at reduced doses th ~here Irectly to the fetus are more 
One other startling result ha ban ose route~ through the mother. 25 
s een reported . m earl t f 
ment, fetal monkeys have th bTt . Y s ages o develop-
This finding opens the exoti: a 1 ~ ~ :o regenerate se~ered limb buds. 
genetic) limb defects in huma ~o~sibihty. that early dmgnosis of (non-
regenerative surgery in utero ~ e uses might some day be treatable by 
N . . 
ot only do these present and f promise a reduction of suffe . f oreseeable prenatal treatments 
ilies and an enhancement in ~~;s or_ affect~d children and their faro-
augur another important devel quality of hfe for ?oth, but they also 
ment of affected fet;;ses are otm.ent .. Prenatal diagnosis and treat-
the fetus itself : the fetus as ~t~ e~m~ m a .new c~nceptualization of 
treatment are concerned ab: t I~n . ractitwners m the field of fetal 
patient relationship to th · u ov-: to adapt the traditional doctor-
t?ird party fetal advocat~: ~~: pa~~en.t and have even issued calls for 
significance of thi·s d l an e mformed consent issues.27 The 
eve opment to th h 
respect for fetal life can be d ose w o are committed to 
measure by the d f · 
caused to those not sharin th . . egree o distress it has 
believes that a woman 's g I _Ish commitment. John Fletcher who 
1 
mora ng t to ab t f ' 
ous of reasons is absolute feel or .or ev~n the most frivo-
e_ncouraging fetal thera ' s ar. a~parent mconsistency in at once 
tlon . "Is it not contradi~:Or~n~ ~:s~:~t~~,g parent~! .choice about abor-
fetus as 'patient ' h ' s,. for physicians to speak of the 
h 
. . ' w en one of the stip 1 t · f ~ ysicians would not d . u a IOns or that role is that 
mdividual?"2B And W ' ll~n er any. circumstances abandon such an 
st . 1 1am Rudd1ck and w ·ll · w · 
ep the fetus-as-patient issue by l b r 1 lam Ilcox, who side-
procedure ask the foil . t a e mg fetal therapy a gynecological 
' owmg ough quest· . " D ~ew moral status by virtue of th wns. . oes the fetus have a 
It? If so, will physicians who e ne~ therapeutic opti_ons available to 
selves in a moral bind? " 29 Thcurren y ?erform abortions find them-
ab · ere certamly m t b · . 
out prenatal diagnosis if it can b t f us e somethmg right 
sort of reflection e par o the provocation for this 
T . . hat somethmg right probabl h . Though our moral values ~ ~s to do with moral psychology. 
erly on the nature of the a~~ obh;~twns regarding the fetus rest prop-
feel those values and d t" emg a Issue, the psychological capacity to 
ci?us in our lives dep~n~s ~oncretely, and thus to make them effica-
With and share the worlds o~r ~any _of us on the ability to interact 
remarkably prescient a . this bemg. _In what appears now as a 
Abortion Argument" r~~c~~· Roger Wertheimer in " Understanding the 
conception of the f t( ) asked, almost rhetorically' whether our 
Ill e us wouldn 't ch ·f aternal abdomen to be t ange I pregnancy caused the 
seen; or if the fetus co~~dm~ ransparent so that the fetus could be 
Periods of time fondled and ~e;emo~ed from ~he womb for short 
' ' urne - and this handling made for 
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healthier babies. Imagining this, he asked, " What would you thin of 
aborting the fetus?" 30 But this is nearly a description of what prer tal 
diagnosis now allows. Real-time sonography virtually allows us t r ;ee 
the fetus. Though fetal surgery does not remove the fetus f_or fond ,1g, 
it does let us touch the fetus, and in doing so, make It healt , er. 
Prenatal diagnosis and the fetal treatment made possible by it, al •ws 
us to interact with the fetus, to bring the fetus into our world n a 
graphic manner. No doubt this will have a growing impa~t on Jur 
collective psychology. It will make it harder and harder to Ignore the 
moral standing of fetuses who are aborted, even as we put greate1 md 
greater energies and expense into caring for and curing other fetus > in 
utero. 
There are two other reasons for favoring prenatal diagnosis J :JW. 
Since the vast majority of diagnoses are negative, it is likely that uch 
results will not only relieve considerable parental anxiety, but will ~!so 
save some fetuses who would otherwise be aborted because of ·on· 
cerns based on maternal age or the previous birth of a child w :h a 
genetic defect. While it is true that this sort of benefit is o~ly poi" Jble 
given the background of the ongoing moral co~ts of abo~t10n, pr1 ;ent 
social reality cannot be ignored . Furthermore, m a situatiOn of w Jely 
available abortion on demand, it is reasonable to assume that a Wl ;nan 
or couple seeking prenatal diagnosis are doing so because they very 
much want a child. Good news about the fetus in this context ! as a 
strong likelihood of leading to a live birth . . . 
Secondly, even when the news is not good, there are considera wns 
which favor prenatal diagnosis. Depending on the nature of the fetal 
defect, the timing and method of delivery may be changed to enhance 
its potential (i.e., an early Caesarean delivery), and steps can be taken 
· · t m to ensure all the proper medical expertise and that eqmpmen IS 
place and ready for any need~d correction a~d sup_port at birt h. 3 \ • 
Furthermore there is another kmd of preparatiOn which may augmen 
the affected fetus's future potential: psychological preparation of the • 
mother or couple . We know that the birth of a defective newborn can 
be traumatic for the parents and that it is associated with psycholog·_ 
ical grieving processes. 32 If parents-to-be of a defective child can have . 
several months to work through this shock and grief, their early rela· . 
tionship with and care of their child can be enhanced. Knowl~dge of 
the impending arrival of such a child can also be the occasiOn for 
increasing the social support available to mother or couple, and such 
social support is highly correlated with increased maternal attachment 
to the fetus, just as stress is highly correlated with decreased maternal 
attachment. 33 Given y1ese opp~rtunities to imp!ove ~n a ?ad hum:u 
situation - opportumhes lost without prenatal diagnosis- It may w 
be that parents have a moral right to prenatal diagnosis, a right to be 
enabled to do the best they can to lessen the sufferings and enhance 
the quality of life for their future child and for themselves. 
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III. Concluding Reflections 
. Havi~g reviewed the new facts which make a reappraisal of prenatal dia~nosJs necessary, it is time now to draw some conclusions. The 
n;taJ?r arg~ment against prenatal diagnosis was its close empirical asso-~Iatwn With selective abortion. New developments in fetal treatment 
1!1 utero show that abortion no longer need be the only medical 
· · response o~en to th~se diagnosing the existence of a defective fetus. 
But a? obvwus ques~wn remains . Though these new options exist, will 
selective abortiOn still be the likeliest result of prenatal diagnosis of a 
fetal defect? !Yfore pointedly, will those persons and institutions who 
oppose_ abortw~ become its unwitting accomplices by providing pre-
natal diagnoses_ m good faith- only to find their patients who receive ~ad news leavmg for other reasons and institutions to secure abor-tion~? . And if this did become the case, to what extent would those 
prov1dmg pre~atal diagnoses bear responsibility for this result? These 
are hard questiOns. · 
The most candid response to the first concern must be that some 
perhaps many.' who ~eceive news of a fetal defect, will have no reai t~eatment optiOn available; or if they do, will elect not to accept the 
nsks of fetal treatment and the remaining likelihood of some lessened ~ut perhaps . significant, defects in their future child. Given the present 
ultural environment, these persons will opt for abortion. Moreover 
sex selection ~ill likely remain legal , and therefore it cannot be ruled 
out ~s a possible consequence of prenatal diagnosis . It follows then 
that If p d · · · ' ' 
es . ersons an . mstitu_twns who_ oppose abortion (I am thinking 
u peciall~ of Cat~ohc hospitals) provide prenatal diagnosis, some will 
se the mformatwn gathered to decide for abortion. Admitting this 
should_ prena~al diagnosis be done by those who oppose abortion? ' 
A. frrst pomt to be made here is that persons may not be morally r~quired to cooperate with an activity they regard as wrong and offen-Sive t th · · be o eu conscience. Consequently, if a hospital opposing abortion 
comes aware that its (non-emergency) services are bei~g used to ~be_t ~bortion, it may rightfully refuse to provide these services to that 
llldividual or couple. Physicians and hospitals may even inquire at the o~tset of any professional relationship as to whether abortion is con-~IVed t_o ~e ~n _option by their would-be patients, and decline prenatal 
agnos1s If It IS. The physician is likely bound under the informed 
co;sent d_octrin~ to alert. a wo_man at risk of the availability of 
: ~atal diagnosis, but he or she ~s no~ required to perform it. 34 The 
ab 
01C~ t~ have prenatal diagnosis With the possibility of selective 
.ortion Is not only a matter for the woman's or the couple 's con-~Ience. As James Childress states: " The physician 's conscience is also lllvol~ed, and he or she is not legally or morally bound to violate COn~cience by pro~iding a~niocentesis (in contrast to providing infor-
lllation about ammocentes1s) or by performing the abortion ."35 
ay, 1984 
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This still leaves us with the difficulty of those who may lie abot 
their intentions at the time they seek prenatal diagnosis or , per hal 
more likely, those who truly feel that abortion is not an option pri< 
to prenatal diagnosis, but who change their minds under the weight ' 
. ;e~ts. Cl~~der:r~: ;%enta~ anxiety is allayed by good diagnostic 
of abortion, ::ay dccur osthlmportantly, a serious cultural rethinking 
. w en more and more f t b 
patients. These considerations incline me to thin~ ~~est t~come our 
prenatal diagnosis now outwei hs a . e good of 
though there are certain! . g the bad. Thus, I conclude that 
what can be crushing bad news. 
To address this moral difficulty, we can probably do no better th< 1 
to appeal to the traditional principle of double effect. 36 According ) 
this principle one judges the moral acceptability of an activity havi g 
both good and bad results by reference to the following four consid 
ations. First, the action issuing in mixed consequences must be eitl ·r 
good or neutral in itself. Secondly, the good consequences must r >t 
follow from the bad consequence, !.e., it cannot be a case of e1 Is 
justifying means. Thirdly, there must be a reasonable proportion ,n 
the relationship of the good and bad consequences, a proport .n 
which balances them or favors the good. Finally, though the 1 td 
consequences can be anticipated, they cannot be desired. This .st 
subjective consideration can be measured by observing the acti ns 
taken to minimize bad consequences and avoiding them entirely w en 
possible. It would appear that one, two, and four are easily satisfied in Lhe 
possible, but likely pre~a~~w~s, un~esirable consequences not only 
double effect princi~le and is th::;:osls now_ ~ass~s th~ tests of the 
oppose abortion on moral ounds ore an a~~lVlty m which those who 
support. Abortions which fonow f~:~ ?p~tlcltpaltde _and w~ich they can 
able b t th ena a 1agnos1s are lament-
pre~a~ d" ey ar~ not the responsibilities of those who have provided 
opposition l:~~:~~e~~l;~~rd:~t ~hnowseorpdrofdessiot~als have made their 
Cl 1 · an ac 10n. 
Even e:,rh~~ ~~ ~~=~:ft!~~~~l of ~ed~cal te?hnolo~y is no easy task. 
advances of d" . o an 1 ea remams stationary the factual 
me 1cme make for t· . ' 
activity rightly condemned one da con mually movmg target. An 
next if the facts of the tt hay may have to be embraced the 
just ~uch an acti . . rna er c an~e. Prenatal diagnosis, I think, is 
the f t . l V1ty. Gwen a commitment to respect all human life 
is pr~b~~~;c ~:~~· t~~e=-t~~ia;~~~~s ~as fuohbably wrong yester~ay: 
tomorrow. 1 w ave to be reappraised 
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The Hippocratic Oath 
I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius anq H ygeia and Panacea and 
all the gods and goddesses, making them m y witnesses , that I will fulfill 
according to my ability and judgment this oath and this cove nant: 
. To hold him who has taught me this art as eq ual to m y parents and to 
h~e my life in partnership with him , and if he is in need of money to givf> 
hJm a share of min e,. and to regard his offspring as eq ual to m y brothers in 
male lineage and to teach them this art- if they desire to learn it - without 
fee and covenant; to give a share of precepts and oral instruction a nd all the 
other learning to m y sons and to the so ns of him who has instructed me and 
to pupils who have signed the covenant and ha ve tak e n an oath according to 
the m edical law, but to no one else . 
.I. will apply di etetic m eas ures for the benefit of the sic k according to my 
ab1hty and judgment; I will keep them fro m harm and injustice. 
I will neith er give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it , nor will I 
make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an 
abortive remedy . In purity and holiness I will guard m y life and my art. 
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